Table of Contents

• 1. Zakat for Political Campaigns?
• 2. Goffman vs Gouldner: Public Mask, Private Self?

1. Zakat for Political Campaigns?

• The latest shenanigans in the US Muslim community is this fatwa on Zakat: Zakat Fatwa
• This fatwa is jointly issued by the Fiqh Council of North America and the Assembly of Muslim Jurists of America.
• Overall Gist: The fatwa talks about the permissibility of giving a portion of Zakat to political institutions to earn the "goodwill" of the government.
  1. The category of 'mu’allafah qulūbuhum' (those whose hearts need to be softened) — which is one of the eight categories eligible for Zakat [Sūrah al-Tawbah, Āyah 60] — is utilized.
  2. A Prophetic incident — giving non-Muslim chieftains large amounts of spoil of war after the Battle of Hunayn — is cited as a precedent.
  3. A broader principle is derived: "at times, the public interest may require allocating funds even to the wealthy, to non-Muslims, or to those of questionable personal character, when that secures a general benefit for the Muslim community."
  4. Medieval scholars, such as al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 728 CE), Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī (d. 742 CE), Ibn Qudāmah (d. 1223 CE) and Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328 CE) are quoted to argue that the Qur'anic category is applicable in all times; i.e., not restricted in its scope and applicability.
  5. Modern scholars, such as Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1905 CE), Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī (d. 2022), and ʿAbdullāh b. Manī are quoted to argue for the permissibility of this Qur'anic category in modern times.
  6. Then, the following is argued:
     • In Western democracies, due to lack of a single ruler, consider individual members of electoral body (members of Parliament, Senate, and Congress) that wield the power of legislation as eligible for Zakat — use it for political influence for the benefit of the Ummah.
     • In absence of a Muslim ruler, a group of trusted scholars and reputable specialists take on the category of  walī al-amr (quoting al-Juwaynī).
  7. While acknowledging that the fatwa widens the scope found in Ḥanbalī and Mālikī schools (these schools generally speak about politicians/rulers who hold real influence and are obeyed in their communities, not those who hold partial influence or those seeking a position), they still argue that ijtihād is warranted, given the changing times and circumstances we live in.
• The scholars on this fatwa recommend the following:
  1. Reputable institutions collect and distribute Zakat funds on behalf of Muslims in any locality or country. These institutions should be fully transparent and operate with accountability. They should have a track record of positive impact + annually monitored and regularly audited.
  2. These institutions and advisory board will decide the causes for which such funds are spent. These causes should directly relate to benefitting the Ummah, either in one's own country or locality, or internationally.
  3. There be reasonable signs to believe such funds would help the cause for which it is being raised.
  4. Only consider this portion of zakat as secondary (allocate perhaps 1/8th). Primary Zakat should always be to the needy and poor.
  5. These institutions must abide by local laws and take advice of legal counsel to ensure they conform to country's laws related to campaign financing.
• Needless to say, this caused a backlash on X.
• One of the more sensible takedown on this issue is that of Joe Bradford, a Taymiyyan Hanbali-adhering expert — On Giving Zakat for Political Campaigns:
  1. Joe concedes that the theoretical principle — the applicability and validity of the Qur'anic category of 'mu’allafah qulūbuhum' — is not abrogated. Joe's own examples for applicability of this category include new convert programs, early learning programs, and targeted media campaigns to combat anti-Muslim sentiments.
  2. He also agrees that political engagement is permissible, and Muslims should be involved in the political process.
  3. He argues that the gap between "theoretically permissible" and "practically viable" is the entire question that needs to be addressed.
  4. Joe says that there is a trend to expand a zakat category to broad interpretation, frame it as an emergency, and keep the expansive meaning without any institutional safeguards. Due to this, there is a danger of the primary recipients of Zakat — the poor and destitute — to be gradually displaced.
  5. He also noticed mismanagement of zakat funds for a different Zakat category (fi sabilillah — in God's path): institutions using the zakat funds more on tenuous expenses (things like gala dinners, marketing, and construction costs) than actually spending it on the poor and needy.
• Joe examines the fatwa stipulated conditions in context of American campaign finance:
  1. Who is eligible for this 'mu’allafah qulūbuhum' category?
     • Joe repudiates application of this category in a democratic governance. The classical scholars assumed the recipient is "a leader obeyed among his people". In Western democracy, it is not clear who the recipient is: is it the candidate? the party? the PAC? the media consultant? the voter? Joe contends that the distributed nature of democratic power differs fundamentally from the tribal leadership structures. A member of Congress is "one vote among hundreds, operating within party structures, committee assignments, donor networks, and electoral pressures that no single contribution can redirect."
  2. What constitutes "benefit" and who measures it?
     • The fatwa requires "reasonable signs" that the Zakat funds help the chosen cause. But, Joe says, this is aspirational language, not an enforceable standard. It is difficult to measure political influence from campaign contributions. Entire industries spend billions annually on lobbying with mixed results. It is hard to fathom that Muslim financial influence can wield any kind of issue.
  3. What happens when the candidate loses?
     • Campaign donations are inherently speculative. It is not possible to verify whether a candidate will win an election in advance. There is high chance that the money will go down the drain without gaining any sense of effectiveness.
  4. What happens when the candidate wins but does not deliver?
     • The most important practical question of all: What if the candidate does not deliver on the promise? After all, he/she face entirely different political pressures when in office.
  5. Who serves as wali al-amr?
     • Joe refuses to take al-Juwayni's citation at face value. The "trusted" scholars and "reputable" specialists: how are these selected? what is their accountability structure? what prevents conflict of interest when these people, who gave a fatwa for permissibility, are embedded in the very institutions that collect+disburse funds?
  6. What prevents this from becoming permanent?
     • The fatwa is framed around an urgent moment. But the institutional mechanisms it proposes (standing organizations, advisory boards, ongoing collection and distributions) are permanent infrastructure. On what basis will they be dismantled? There are high chances that this category, once opened for this purpose, will not close.
  7. What about the legal exposure?
     • The fatwa does not address how a zakat-collecting organization could direct funds to political campaigns without jeopardizing its nonprofit standing. The reality of American nonprofit law is complicated. Most Muslim organizations are positioned to operate as 501(c)(3) tax-exempt entities. Under federal law, 501(c)(3) organizations are absolutely prohibited from participating in political campaign on behalf/opposition of any candidate for public office.
  8. What about political pressure on the organizations themselves?
     • There are high chances that a Zakat disbursing organization for political purposes becomes a target for scrutiny from law enforcement, regulatory agencies, and political actors.
• In conclusion, Joe thinks that using Zakat for political purposes is not needed: Sadaqah and general charity are enough as concepts to fund political engagement.
• Overall Impressions:
  • I think that, generally, there is an urgent need for a recreative formulation of Shar'ia and adapting it to present circumstances.
  • However, it was disappointing to read the paucity of intellectual rigor in the Fatwa that was produced: it lacked a comprehensive understanding of the reality on the ground.
  • It felt like an ideal was decided ("Muslims should engage in the political process") and a theoretical principle traced and expanded by cherrypicking a certain narrative + scholars without doing the important work of examining why and how exactly this theoretical principle should be applied.
  • Vague prescriptions are not enough; honestly, it indicates the lack of depth and research of this Fatwa.
  • As a follow-up, I need to read this paper: The Use and Misuse of Zakāh Funds by Religious Institutions in North America
  • Another follow-up on the lack of political strategy and coordination amongst Texas Muslims: Power without purpose

2. Goffman vs Gouldner: Public Mask, Private Self?

• Erving Goffman and Alvin Ward Gouldner were both American sociologists; they died in the 1980s.
• I was reading something that referenced both of these sociologists. I thought it was quite interesting.
• Erving Goffman:
  • Work: The Presentation of Self in Every Day Life (1956)
  • In this book, Goffman argues that, in any given situation, every individual attempts to control others by controlling the impression he makes on them.
  • The individual does this by trying to suppress his feelings and present a view of himself to others that accords with his objectives in the particular situation.
  • In the process of face-to-face interaction, there are situations in which first impressions are critical.
  • Goffman cites a teacher talking about the importance of first impressions presented to school pupils:
    • "You can't ever let them get the upper hand on you or you're through. So I started out tough. The first day I get a new class in, I let them know who's boss... You've got to start off tough, then you can ease up as you go along. If you start out easy-going, when you try to get tough, they'll just look at you and laugh".
  • Similarly, Goffman cites other examples to stress the importance of presenting an authoritative persona in encountering weaker or personally disoriented and socially disturbing individuals.
  • The actor's body-voice is the medium; the presentation is the message.
  • The persona represented is not merely a personal presentation; it helps construct a certain kind of social order.
• Alvin Ward Gouldner:
  • Work: The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (1970)
  • In this book, Gouldner, in general, critiques the detached "value-free" "objective" obsession in sociology.
  • He also attacks Goffman and the previously mentioned book.
  • He believes that Goffman's worldview marks a radical change in the world, "from men capable of moral indignation to 'merchants of morality'; from men of self-absorbed Calvinist conscience to gamesmen adroitly making their moves, not in accord with inward consultation, but in shrewd anticipation of the other's countermove,... from the criticisms of 'insincerity' to the acceptance that all is insincerity."
  • Goffman's theory, says Gouldner, is that behavior that appears spontaneous is really a calculated show.
  • Gouldner's fundamental argument is that Goffman's sociology is an ideological expression of the world in which the educated middle classes in the West now live, a world experienced in a new way, giving rise to new conceptions of "reality" through affects that undermine what was once their living tradition.
  • The middle classes now live in a world of uncertainty that they cannot control.
  • Written before neoliberalism became the official ideology of most governments, Gouldner's book regards the irrationalities of modern political economy as intrinsic to both civil society and the state.
  • It attributes the attenuation of public authority and political legitimacy to the underlying deceptions of civil society and the state.
• Overall Impressions:
  • I find the distinction of an individual self and a public persona fascinating in Goffman's work. The public persona is rendered to be some kind of a performance: a technique that one needs to master to advance their (often secretive) individual agendas.
  • It reminds me of these "techniques" you find in self-help books like "How to Win Friends and Influence People" or "Charisma on Command" videos.
  • It also makes me think if this distinction makes one less accountable. If your public persona is not really you but an act, then are your public actions severed from who you really are?
  • It also reminds me of how politicians, or even how some of us behave in the corporate world.
  • The calculated nature of what to reveal vs what not to is quite devious, in my opinion.
  • The specific example of the importance of first impression reminds me of a life advice my friend gave me years ago: You need to appear tougher, or else, people will take advantage of you.
  • Islamically, the separation of an individual self with your public persona would be something akin to Nifaq (Hypocrisy).
  • I also think Gouldner's critique is valid: the dismissal of sincerity and substituting "gamesmanship" for morality.
  • More on Erving Goffman:
    • Two on the Aisle
  • More on Alvin Ward Gouldner:
    • Testing Gouldner's coming crisis theory: on the state of contemporary sociological theory